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I. INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, Tropical Depression Twelve formed
near Nassau in the Bahamas.1 Six days later, the storm made landfall in
southeastern Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, a category four hurricane
with sustained winds up to 135 miles per hour.2 New Orleans Mayor C.
Ray Nagin issued a voluntary evacuation on Saturday, August 27, followed
by a mandatory evacuation order the following day.3 Eighty percent of
the New Orleans population heeded these evacuation orders prior to
Hurricane Katrina’s arrival, but as many as 100,000 remained.4 Those
who remained behind, through choice or lack of available transportation,
rode out the storm in their neighborhoods or designated refuges.5
Hurricane Katrina left massive destruction in its wake: over one
thousand dead,6 over $35 billion in insured property damage,7 and over
$60 billion appropriated by Congress for rebuilding efforts.8 The size
1. Oversight Hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting Before the H. Select
Comm. for Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (written testimony of Max
Mayfield, Director, Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center), available at
http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/Testimony/mayfieldhouse92205.pdf [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing]. A tropical depression is a storm that forms over a tropical ocean with a core
warmer than the surrounding atmosphere and fastest sustained surface winds of less than
thirty-nine miles per hour. BOB SHEETS & JACK WILLIAMS, HURRICANE WATCH 319
(2001).
2. Oversight Hearing, supra note 1, at 12. The Saffir-Simpson scale categorizes
hurricanes on a scale of one to five, with five being the most severe. See SHEETS &
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 319. Wind speed is the determining factor in the scale,
which is used to estimate potential property damage and flooding expected along the
coast from a hurricane landfall. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, http://www.
nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
3. Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy]. Nagin
initially directed his staff to issue a mandatory evacuation order on Saturday, but debates
over whether to exempt hospitals delayed the order until Sunday. Eric Lipton, White
House Knew of Levee’s Failure on Night of Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at A1
[hereinafter Lipton, Levee’s Failure].
4. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1.
5. Black or African Americans constitute 67.3% of the New Orleans population,
according to the 2000 census. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (follow links to Louisiana then New
Orleans). Over one-quarter of the population lives below the poverty line. Id.
6. CNN.com, Katrina’s Official Death Toll Tops 1,000, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/US/09/21/katrina.impact/ (last visited July 15, 2006).
7. H.R. Res. 477, 109th Cong. (2005). Recent figures estimate the damage at
$81.2 billion, making it the costliest hurricane in U.S. history. Hurricane Katrina,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricanekatrina (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
8. Congress initially provided $10.5 billion for Hurricane Katrina relief in a bill
which President Bush signed into law on September 2, 2005. Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising from the Consequences of
Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988. President Bush immediately
requested an additional $51.8 billion. Congress provided this additional funding through
a second bill that President Bush signed into law on September 8, 2005. Second
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and scope of Hurricane Katrina’s wreckage prompted a national
response. A major disaster or state of emergency was declared in fortysix of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.9 Former Presidents
Clinton and George H.W. Bush spearheaded a private fundraising effort,
and communities throughout the country opened their homes and wallets
to support the relief effort.
In contrast to the commendable outpouring of support by individuals,
domestic and worldwide, the initial response from the federal, state, and
local governments was roundly criticized. Media coverage excoriated
officials from President George W. Bush and then-Federal Emergency
Management Agency Director Michael Brown, to Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin.10
Criticisms focused on the uncoordinated response, raising questions about
national emergency preparedness in a post-September 11th context.11
The colossal size and scope of wreckage should not overshadow the
immeasurable losses sustained on an individual level by Katrina victims.
Nevertheless, the United States has mechanisms in place to cope with
the long-term impacts of Hurricane Katrina. Public officials announced
their commitment to rebuild communities destroyed in the Gulf coast
region.12 The political process can hold decisionmakers accountable for
their shortcomings.13 Congressional investigations are bringing to light
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising from
the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119 Stat. 1990.
9. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2005 Federal Disaster Declarations,
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005 (last visited July 15, 2006). Major
disaster declarations were issued as a direct result of Katrina’s impact in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Id. Katrina’s direct impact also resulted in a state of
emergency declaration for Arkansas and Texas. Id. The remaining emergency declarations
arose from evacuation efforts. Only Alaska, Hawaii, Vermont, and Wyoming did not request
emergency assistance as a result of Katrina. Id. The difference between major disasters
and emergencies is discussed infra, Part III.B., text accompanying notes 117-19.
10. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, Ex-FEMA Chief Tells of
Frustration and Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1; Jennifer Steinhauer & Eric
Lipton, FEMA, Slow to the Rescue, Now Stumbles in Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2005, at A1.
11. E.g., Who’s in Charge?, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2005, at A20; Philip Shenon,
Commission Criticizes Storm Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A23.
12. For example, President Bush stated that efforts to rebuild the Gulf Coast region
would be “one of the largest reconstruction efforts the world has ever seen.” President
George W. Bush, Address from Jackson Square (Sept. 15, 2005), www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/09/; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Federal Role in
Rebuilding Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1.
13. President Bush’s approval ratings dropped to 41% in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, the lowest level his presidency had seen at the time. James G. Lakely, Bush’s
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lessons learned from this tragedy.14 Aid programs will assist victims in
piecing their lives and families back together.
A separate question, however, is whether these mechanisms are
sufficient in light of the admittedly inadequate initial response.15 For
many Katrina victims, these ex post systems do not address the injuries
suffered at the peak of the crisis. One of the most alarming images from
Katrina’s aftermath depicted displaced victims unable to receive emergency
food and water supplies.16
This Comment contends that judicial review should be available to
Katrina victims whose injuries arose from failure to receive emergency
food supplies. Reviewing the liability landscape in its entirety would
require investigation of laws, regulations, and plans on the federal, state,
and municipal levels.17 Instead, this Comment focuses specifically on
claims that New Orleans residents might pursue against the federal
government for its failure to provide adequate food.18
Part II discusses the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional
bar to claims against the government. It reviews the English common
law history of sovereign immunity before analyzing the doctrine’s
application in the American legal regime. Part II pays particular attention to
the “discretionary function” exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act
and federal disaster relief legislation.
Approval At Lowest Level Yet, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Sept. 16, 2005, at A14, available at
http://washingtontimes.com/ (search long term archives for the article title). FEMA
Director Michael Brown was forced to resign his post. Peter Eisler & Mimi Hall, New
FEMA Chief Takes Center Stage After Years in Wings, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2005, at
A2, available at http://usatoday.com (search for the article title). While public opinion
of Brown plummeted, former FEMA director James Lee Witt’s reputation soared. See
Leslie Wayne & Glen Justice, FEMA Leader Under Clinton Makes It Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2005, at A1.
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-396 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/house/katrina/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
15. Bush Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/16/europe/web.0915kat1.php
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
16. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1.
17. For an exploration of issues surrounding the relationship between federal and
state governments responding to catastrophic public health emergencies, see Michael
Greenberger, The Role of the Federal Government in Response to Catastrophic Health
Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law,
Research Paper No. 2005-52 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstractid=824184 (download from links at the bottom of the page).
18. This Comment also notes possible claims Hurricane Katrina victims might
bring alleging discrimination on the part of the federal government in providing disaster
assistance. See infra notes 127, 183. Nonpartisan polls showed that “[t]wo-thirds of
African-Americans said the government’s response to [Hurricane Katrina] would have
been faster if most of the victims had been white, while 77 percent of whites disagreed.”
Elisabeth Bumiller, Gulf Coast Isn’t the Only Thing Left in Tatters; Bush’s Status with
Blacks Takes a Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at A17.
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Part III describes the development and growth of federal disaster
relief. It focuses on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act,19 the
legislation which drives federal disaster relief, and specifically on
provisions regarding food commodities20 and federal government liability.21
Part IV examines how the doctrine of sovereign immunity interacts
with the Stafford Act. Issues of proof are not addressed because
sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question. Instead, tentative lines
of argument are sketched to address whether the federal government
may be held liable for failing to provide adequate food supplies for
victims in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Part V discusses two potential vehicles for recovery: a victims’
compensation fund similar to that created for the victims of the
September 11th World Trade Center attacks,22 and a class action. Assuming
Hurricane Katrina victims’ claims overcome the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, Part V recommends that Hurricane Katrina victims seek
recovery through class action litigation due to the problems inherent in a
victims’ compensation fund and the efficiency gains made possible by a
class action.
This Comment is not intended to heap further blame on public
officials. Political recriminations remain properly with the respective
actors in the political arena. Rather, this Comment concerns itself with
the legal implications of the federal government’s response—whether
the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the government from liability
for failing to provide adequate food.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides a jurisdictional bar to
suits brought against the government. Originating in English law,
sovereign immunity was subsequently infused into the American legal
regime. Legislation in the twentieth century waived sovereign immunity
for certain claims, most notably through the Federal Tort Claims Act
19. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206
(2000).
20. Id. § 5180 (food commodities).
21. Id. § 5148 (liability of the government). The Stafford Act also prohibits
discrimination in providing disaster relief. See id. § 5151.
22. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101, provided incentives to channel tort claims to the Fund.
Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003).
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(FTCA).23 The FTCA partially retains sovereign immunity through a
variety of exceptions. Most relevant for present purposes is the “discretionary
function” exception, which shields the government from liability for
policy-driven decisions of government agents.24 Federal disaster relief
legislation contains a similar exception.25
To successfully pursue claims against the federal government, New
Orleans’s Hurricane Katrina victims must first establish that sovereign
immunity does not bar them. The following discussion outlines the origins
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, its application in American law,
and the retention of sovereign immunity via the discretionary function
exception.
A. Roots in English Common Law
The doctrine of sovereign immunity stemmed from the “necessary and
fundamental” principle of the English Constitution that “the king can do
no wrong.”26 By this principle, the King could not be held personally
liable for any injury arising from the conduct of public affairs, though
his ministers could be held accountable for such conduct.27 Nor could
the King be held liable for any personal injuries suffered by individual
citizens.28 The distance between the sovereign and his subjects made it
unlikely that the King would come in contact with an ordinary subject;
the law extended this into a blanket immunity for private injuries.29
The King could do the people no harm because the royal prerogative
was created to serve their best interests.30 Moreover, the King could not
be commanded by a higher authority—“for who shall command the
king?”—without infringing the dignity and sovereignty of the royal
person.31 Subjects could inform the King of their injury, however, at
which time he could order his judges to resolve the harm suffered by the
23. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24. See infra Parts II.C., III.D.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 5148.
26. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *254-55. Some may argue that this
phrase could be interpreted to mean that a remedy must exist against the sovereign,
because it would be a “wrong” for a harm to go unremedied. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 n.1 (2001). Others argue that
English sovereign immunity was more focused on the method of obtaining redress of
injuries than an absolute prohibition on redress itself. E.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the
Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 542 (2003).
27. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *254-55.
28. Id. at *255.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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aggrieved subject.32 This practice grew into the common law rule that a
sovereign may not be sued without its consent.33
B. Incorporation in American Law
American law incorporates certain principles of sovereign immunity.34
The government has replaced the King as sovereign and may not be sued
without its own consent.35 This immunity extends to federal agencies.36
The federal and state governments can consent to suit through statutes
enacted by their respective legislatures.37 Consent to suit is also referred
to as a waiver of sovereign immunity.38 Waiver of the government’s
sovereign immunity operates very narrowly: the waiver must be
“unequivocally expressed” in the statutory language,39 courts construe a
waiver of sovereign immunity strictly in favor of the government,40 and
courts will not enlarge the waiver beyond the requirements of the
statutory language.41
32. Id. Blackstone’s Commentaries view the King as a benevolent person for
whom “[t]o know of an injury and to redress it are inseparable. . . .” Id.
33. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also Douglas
Kahle, Note, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.: “Unequivocal,” Yet Unwarranted,
Support for Sovereign Immunity, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 326-27 (1994).
34. Sovereign immunity in the United States was initially a result of the judicial
conclusion that Article III was subject to common law, relying primarily on statements
made in the Federalist Papers and the ratification debates. See Susan Randall, Sovereign
Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2002). The first Supreme
Court opinion addressing the issue held that sovereign immunity had not been
transplanted from English common law. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
471-72 (1793). The Court abandoned this position by 1834 and held that the doctrine
protected the federal government from civil liability. See Mark C. Niles, “Nothing But
Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1289 (2002).
35. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586 (“[T]he terms of [the United States’] consent to be sued
in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”).
36. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citing Fed. Hous. Admin.
v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940)).
37. Waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity thus requires an act of
Congress. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 515 (1940).
38. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999).
39. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586; see also United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S.
486, 489 (1878) (describing the “basis of universal consent and recognition” as attributes
of sovereignty that the federal government possesses, and that justify the unequivocal
expression requirement).
40. E.g., United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992).
41. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). The Court in
Kubrick stated, “we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity creates tension between several
important policies. Sovereign immunity is said to promote government
efficiency.42 Eliminating suits leaves the government free and unfettered
in the pursuit of its official business,43 and avoids frivolous litigation.44
On the other hand, eliminating suits impedes the democratic notion that
the government and governmental officials should be held accountable
for their decisions.45 The threat of damages creates an incentive for the
government to comply with the law.46 Sovereign immunity may therefore
lead to a lower quality of government decisionmaking and reduced
accountability.
Sovereign immunity also operates to protect the public treasury; permitting
lawsuits against the government could lead to a raid on the treasury with
the costs passed along to the taxpaying public.47 This goal also results in
undesirable outcomes. Instead of distributing the costs of improper
governmental action equally among the taxpayers, the injured individual
bears the entire loss.48 Additionally, sovereign immunity shifts claims
for money damages to individual officers whom the doctrine does not
protect.49
Separation of powers, including principles of judicial restraint, provides a
final justification for sovereign immunity.50 This justification contradicts
which Congress intended.” Id. In the event the Court construes the waiver too narrowly,
the Court leaves to Congress the option of extending the waiver further. Id. at 125.
42. See Randall, supra note 34, at 100-01.
43. See, e.g., Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (4th Cir. 1971).
44. See Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 1219 (noting the claim implicit in
arguments supporting sovereign immunity that adequate alternatives obviate the need for
governmental liability); cf. infra, Part V.A. (examining the likelihood and desirability of
a victim compensation fund as an alternative to liability).
45. See Randall, supra note 34, at 100-01; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at
1214.
46. Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1214.
47. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999):
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect of
being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status of a
debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers on
the public’s behalf.
Id. at 749. Professor Chemerinsky criticizes the Court’s statement in Alden as elevating
fiscal concerns over the need for governmental accountability. Chemerinsky, supra note
26, at 1217.
48. Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1217.
49. See id. at 1218-19.
50. “The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of
the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but
mischief . . . .” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704
(1949), superceded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 702, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392
(quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840)); accord Littell v.
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (1971) (“The rationale for sovereign immunity essentially
boils down to substantial bothersome interference with the operation of government.”).
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the judiciary’s role in holding the other branches accountable for their
actions.51 Furthermore, separation of powers does not operate to insulate
the activities of the government from judicial review.52
Sovereign immunity may also be challenged on constitutional and
historical grounds.53 Sovereign immunity arguably violates the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution by allowing a common law doctrine to trump
the Constitution and federal law.54 One may also question whether the
Founders intended to maintain this vestige of the government they had
just overthrown, and they may have understood ratification of the
Constitution to provide the consent necessary to waive sovereign
immunity on the part of the States.55 These criticisms have led some to
advocate the total abolishment of sovereign immunity, though others
recognize that the doctrine is too firmly entrenched to eliminate.56
C. The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Discretionary
Function Exception
In the mid-twentieth century, Congress exercised its prerogative to
waive sovereign immunity and permitted citizens to sue the federal
government.57 The Federal Tort Claims Act58 (FTCA) allowed suits
against the government in situations where a private individual would be
This defense has also been described as a fear of replacing the democratic process with
“government through litigation.” Niles, supra note 34, at 1312.
51. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 573 (stating that a principal argument in favor of
an independent judiciary is its ability to hold government accountable and render
impartial justice between the government and the people).
52. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1218.
53. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 1 (attacking the historical basis for
sovereign immunity and suggesting that prudential doctrines can sufficiently protect
separation of powers). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 26 (arguing that
sovereign immunity cannot be justified on either originalist or non-originalist grounds).
54. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1211-12.
55. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 26, 31.
56. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1224 (predicting that the Court will
abolish sovereign immunity), with Randall, supra note 34, at 104 (suggesting prudential
doctrines such as political question, common law duty, and discretionary function
exceptions can sufficiently ensure separation of powers). Professor Jackson suggests the
courts originally invoked sovereign immunity in part to sustain judicial independence.
Jackson, supra note 26, at 608. She notes that because defiance of judgments has
diminished, the doctrine should not restrain courts from providing remedies to address
violations of legal rights. Id. at 609.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
58. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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liable for similar actions.59 Certain exceptions apply, including claims
for punitive damages.60 More importantly, the FTCA retains immunity for
acts of government employees in the execution of statutes or regulations,
and for acts based on the exercise of a discretionary function.61
Congress went through several drafts of the FTCA before settling on
the final language of the discretionary function exception. Attempts to
enunciate the degree to which the FTCA retained sovereign immunity
covered a wide range of possible language. One draft of the FTCA did
not enumerate an exception at all, assuming that courts would recognize
the bill did not extend to discretionary administrative actions.62 Other
proposals exempted specific spheres of federal activity from liability,
such as postal service.63 The final version of the FTCA presented the
discretionary function exception as a clarifying amendment to assure
protection against tort liability for errors in administration or in the
exercise of discretionary functions.64
Even with explicit language, judicial interpretation of the discretionary
function exception has followed a tortuous path. The first case involving
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). The FTCA was not the first legislative
waiver of sovereign immunity. The Tucker Act, enacted in 1887, waived sovereign
immunity for claims against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, any
act of Congress, any regulation of an executive department, any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort. Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (1887) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)). The FTCA added to these statutes by allowing suits alleging
tort liability on the part of the government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
60. “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for
punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
interpreted “punitive damages” to mean the recovery amount legally considered
“punitive damages” under traditional common law principles. See Molzof v. United
States, 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992). The Court in Molzof rejected the argument that § 2674
bars recovery for any damages beyond the plaintiff’s actual loss. Id. at 306.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to—(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
62. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 (1953).
63. Id. Other protected spheres included the activities of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the collection of taxes. Id. The final version of the
discretionary function exception retained specific protections for postal service, tax and
customs, imposition of a quarantine, the fiscal operations of the Treasury Department
and certain banks, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Panama Canal Company. 28
U.S.C. § 2680(b)-(n) (2000).
64. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26-27.
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the discretionary function exception failed to clarify the exception’s
scope and created a “quagmire” of amorphous distinctions.65 The Court
later clarified the policies behind the exception but still failed to
enunciate a workable approach.66 After forty years of judicial floundering,
the courts created and proceeded to refine a two-part test, which now
governs the discretionary function exception.
1. The Quagmire of Early Doctrine
The Supreme Court first addressed the discretionary function exception in
Dalehite v. United States.67 Two ships docked in Texas City, Texas,
caught fire, and exploded, leveling much of the city and killing many
people.68 The ships carried ammonium nitrate, a substance long used as
a component in explosives.69 Plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of
the federal government for shipping such cargo to a congested area
without warning of the possibility of explosion.70
In a narrow decision,71 Dalehite held the negligence alleged fell within
the discretionary function exception.72 The Court focused its discussion
of the exception on whether the acts were of a governmental nature or
function, but it shed little insight on the scope of the exception.73 The
65. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955); see also
Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365, 367 (1995)
(characterizing the guidance Dalehite provided for other cases as “somewhat muddled”).
66. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984); see also Zillman, supra
note 65, at 370.
67. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
68. Id. at 23. The explosion resulted in 8500 plaintiffs seeking $200 million in
damages. Zillman, supra note 65, at 368.
69. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 21. Timothy McVeigh used ammonium nitrate in the in
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. See Scientist Details Oklahoma City Bomb Residue,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A20. Federal officials and employees were involved in a
program to produce fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) as part of the post-World
War II effort to stabilize the agricultural economies of Germany, Japan, and Korea. John
W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function Exception from
Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 AM. BUS. L.J.
223, 226 (1992).
70. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23.
71. Dalehite was decided four-to-three, with Justices Douglas and Clark not
participating in the decision. Id. at 45.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 36. The Court reasoned that because the FTCA only provides for
liability in situations where a private person would be liable, the FTCA did not apply to
uniquely governmental functions in which a private person could not engage. Id. at 2728.
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Court viewed the exception broadly, such that any decision which
originated at the executive level remained shielded from liability.74 The
dissenting opinion applied the governmental/non-governmental function
analysis but argued that the case involved actions akin to those of a
private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper.75 Later cases criticized the
governmental/non-governmental distinction as a “quagmire.”76
Nearly thirty years after Dalehite, the scope of the discretionary
function exception remained undefined.77 In United States v. Varig
Airlines,78 the Court continued an expansive view of the levels at which
policymaking occurred, which prevented it from describing the outer
limits of the exception. The Court enunciated some of the policies
furthered by the exception, but the test it promulgated provided little
guidance to future cases.79
The Varig Court characterized the exception as an attempt to prevent
judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions
through the medium of tort actions.80 In other words, Congress created
the discretionary function exception to promote governmental efficiency.81
74. “It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations
of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.” Id. at 36.
The broad view of the exception illustrated in Dalehite nearly reached the traditional
limits on government liability. See Niles, supra note 34, at 1318.
75. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that
“[t]he Government, as landowner, as manufacturer, as shipper, as warehouseman, as
shipowner and operator, is carrying on activities indistinguishable from those performed
by private persons.” Id. The balancing of considerations by officials was no different
than the balancing which citizens do “at their peril.” Id. The Dalehite decision would
likely have come out differently today; “the handling techniques used and [ammonium
nitrate’s] storage near other explosives would probably be classified outside the policy
making realm.” See Bagby & Gittings, supra note 69, at 228.
76. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). The Court in
Indian Towing characterized the distinction as an “irreconcilable conflict” that “plagued
the law of municipal corporations,” and was rendered unnecessary by the FTCA. Id.
77. No clear description of the scope of the FTCA discretionary function exception
emerged from the cases decided in the period between Dalehite and Varig. In fact, some
cases seemed to point in different directions, prompting the Varig Court to admit that the
Supreme Court’s reading of the FTCA had “not followed a straight line. . . .” United
States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 811 (1984); see also Zillman, supra note 65, at
369 (noting that lower federal courts between 1953 and 1984 applied the discretionary
function exception by interpreting the language of Dalehite).
78. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
79. Plaintiffs in Varig alleged negligence on the part of the Civil Aeronautics
Agency, a predecessor of the Federal Aviation Administration, in inspecting and issuing
a certificate to an aircraft that did not comply with fire safety requirements. Id. at 80001. A fire broke out in one of the aircraft lavatories. The smoke filled the cabin and
cockpit, and “124 of the 135 persons on board died from asphyxiation or the effects of
toxic gases produced by the fire.” Id.
80. Id. at 814. This statement reflects separation of powers concerns and fear of
“government through litigation.” See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
81. Varig, 467 U.S. at 814.

710

SMITH.DOC

11/10/2006 8:47 AM

[VOL. 43: 699, 2006]

Hurricane Katrina
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Court attempted to isolate factors describing the reach of the
discretionary function exception. While those factors were of little use,
they helped set the stage for a more workable approach by describing the
purpose behind the exception.82
2. Berkovitz: A Two-Part Test Emerges
A few years later, the Court clarified and expanded on Varig to create
a more workable approach to the discretionary function exception. In
Berkovitz v. United States,83 Justice Marshall enunciated the first version
of the two-part test for determining application of the exception. First, a
court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the
governmental employee.84 The exception will not apply if the relevant
federal statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific course of
action.85 Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element of
judgment, that judgment must be of the type the exception was designed
to shield.86
The Court summarized the discretionary function exception as
insulating the government from liability “if the action challenged in the
case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”87 In order
for the exception to apply, the government must prove that the decision

82. The “factors” identified in Varig were hardly factors at all. All that one can
glean from the Varig opinion is that the discretionary function exception protects acts
that Congress intended to shield, and that the exception encompasses the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as regulator of the conduct of private
individuals. See id. at 813-14. Finding that both of these “factors” existed, the Court
held the discretionary function exception barred plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 821.
83. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). Plaintiffs in Berkovitz alleged wrongful approval and
release of a polio vaccine which, rather than vaccinating their child, caused him to
contract the disease. Id. at 533.
84. Id. at 536.
85. Id. The Court found that the discretionary function exception did not bar
plaintiffs’ allegation that the vaccine was wrongly approved and licensed because the
statute and regulations at issue required that the agency receive certain test data as a
precondition to licensing. Id. at 542-43. The agency had no discretion to approve and
license the vaccine without first receiving the test data. Id.
86. Id. at 536-37. The Court noted in dicta that the discretionary function
exception would bar claims challenging the agency’s policy formulations of the
appropriate way to regulate the release of vaccines. Id. at 546. The Court noted that the
regulatory scheme governing release of vaccines was substantially similar to the
certification process discussed in Varig. Id.
87. Id. at 537.
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involved an element of judgment, and that the judgment was based on
considerations of public policy.88
Cases after Berkovitz further developed the two-part test and broadened
the protection offered by the discretionary function exception. The Court in
United States v. Gaubert89 created a “strong presumption” that an act
authorized by a regulation involves considerations of policy if the regulation
allows the employee discretion.90 Additionally, the first prong of the test
now includes examination of whether a statutory duty provides a “fixed or
readily ascertainable standard” to guide a government official in performing
those duties.91 A statute or regulation meets this standard if it “mandates
that a government agent perform his or her function in a specific manner.”92
III. FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF LEGISLATION
Before examining the details of the Katrina response, it is important to
provide a basic overview of the primary source of federal disaster
assistance. Centralized federal disaster relief legislation began with the
Disaster Relief Act of 1950.93 Revisions to that act culminated with the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Stafford Act).94 The
Stafford Act improved upon earlier disaster relief legislation and
expanded the federal role in disaster relief.
This Part reviews previous disaster relief legislation and describes
provisions of the Stafford Act particularly relevant to a claim Hurricane
Katrina victims might bring against the federal government for inadequate
supplies of food commodities.95 It also discusses a provision of the Stafford
Act similar to the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.96
A. Early Disaster Relief
Congress passed the first federal disaster relief act in 1950.97 The
primary purpose of the bill was to provide a general congressional policy
with respect to federal disaster relief.98 The Disaster Relief Act of 1950
88. Id.
89. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
90. Id. at 324. For a discussion of the extent to which this presumption broadens
the reach of the discretionary function exception, see Niles, supra note 34, at 1328-34.
91. Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 1124-25.
93. Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109.
94. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000).
95. Id. § 5180. This Comment also refers to § 5151 of the Stafford Act, which
requires nondiscrimination in disaster assistance. See infra notes 127, 183.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5148.
97. Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109.
98. § 1; 96 CONG. REC. 11896 (1950) (statements of Rep. Whittington).
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(DRA) authorized the President to coordinate all governmental agencies
in major disasters.99 The DRA established a fund enabling the government
to give direct relief to disaster areas when disasters arose, rather than
requiring Congress to respond to each situation individually.100
Prior to the DRA, Congress would appropriate varying amounts on an
ad hoc basis in response to particular disasters.101 The DRA intended to
centralize funding and create a more systematic approach to disaster
relief.102 In subsequent years, Congress revised and expanded upon the
DRA in 1966,103 1969,104 and 1970.105
B. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974
The 1970 Act was frequently used and sometimes criticized during the
three years of its existence.106 In 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on
99. § 5(a), 64 Stat. at 1110 (“In the interest of providing maximum mobilization of
Federal assistance under this Act, the President is authorized to coordinate in such
manner as he may determine the activities of Federal agencies in providing disaster
assistance”); 96 CONG. REC. 11895 (1950) (statements of Rep. Cox).
100. The 1950 DRA established a fund of $5 million. § 8, 64 Stat. at 1111. From
1803 to 1947, Congress enacted approximately 128 specific relief acts. See PETER J.
MAY, RECOVERING FROM CATASTROPHES 20 (1985).
101. RUTH M. STRATTON, DISASTER RELIEF 31 (1989). The prevailing view was
that disaster relief was a state and local responsibility. Id. For an overview of late
nineteenth and early twentieth-century disaster relief appropriations, see Michele Landis
Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387 (2005). Cf. Howard Gillman,
Disaster Relief, “Do Anything” Spending Powers, and the New Deal, 23 LAW & HIST. REV.
443 (2005) (questioning Dauber’s claim that constitutional issues related to disaster relief
offered a significant foundation for New Deal legislation); see also Michele L. Landis, “Let
Me Next Time Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare
State, 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998) (arguing the origin of the American welfare
state lies in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century disputes over disaster relief).
102. See MAY, supra note 100, at 23. May characterizes pre-1950 disaster policy as
“distributing relief assistance in a pork-barrel fashion.” Id. at 21.
103. Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, 80 Stat. 1316. The 1966 Act
made amendments to the 1950 Act extending disaster-specific provisions. MAY, supra
note 100, at 24. Notable provisions of the 1966 Act made rural communities eligible for
assistance and provided funding for damage to higher education facilities and for repair
of public facilities under construction. Id.
104. Disaster Relief Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-79, 83 Stat. 125. The 1969 Act
was limited to fifteen months in duration. MAY, supra note 100, at 24.
105. Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744. The 1970 Act
was an outgrowth of the Hurricane Camile response and included most provisions of the
expiring 1969 Act, with an emphasis on expanding relief assistance for individuals.
MAY, supra note 100, at 25.
106. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070,
3070. Under the 1970 Act, the President declared 111 major disasters in forty-one different
states. Id.
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Disaster Relief held field hearings in four cities that suffered severe
losses in major disasters.107 This investigation resulted in the Stafford
Act.108 The Stafford Act retained the basic pattern of public and private
assistance seen in the 1970 Act.109 It refined the 1970 Act by modifying
its provisions in response to changing conditions and resources.110
The Stafford Act covers a broad range of topics: disaster preparedness
and mitigation assistance,111 major disaster and emergency assistance
administration,112 and major disaster assistance programs.113 The
Stafford Act aimed to increase the ability of the federal government to
respond effectively and to expedite long-range recovery operations.114
Congress intended “to provide an orderly and continuing means of
assistance by the Federal Government to state and local governments in
carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate [disaster-related] suffering
and damage. . . .”115

107. The hearings took place in Biloxi, MS (following Hurricane Camile), Rapid
City, SD (flooding), Wilkes-Barre, PA (Hurricane Agnes), and Elmira, NY (Hurricane
Agnes). See 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10510 (1974). At the time, Hurricane Agnes was
the worst disaster in U.S. history, causing $3.5 billion in storm damage (in 1972 dollars)
and 122 deaths. Bartlett C. Hagemeyer & Scott M. Spratt, Thirty Years After Hurricane
Agnes: The Forgotten Florida Tornado Disaster, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mlb/agnes30.
html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
108. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206
(2000); see also S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 3 (1974).
109. Both the 1970 and Stafford Acts authorized the President to provide disaster
preparation assistance to local and state governments. See Disaster Relief Act of 1970
§§ 206(a), (b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5131(a), (b). Both Acts also allowed for a federal role in
providing temporary housing and rental assistance to private individuals. See Disaster
Relief Act of 1970 § 226; 42 U.S.C. § 5174.
110. The previous disaster relief acts created a pattern of expanded benefits,
resulting in forty-eight disaster declarations and an expenditure of $713,889,127 from
the Disaster Fund in 1972. STRATTON, supra note 101, at 45. The Nixon administration
sought to transfer direct management of disaster programs back to the state governments,
in keeping with the “New Federalism” approach of the early Nixon years, but Congress
rejected the proposal. Id. The philosophical issues surrounding the appropriate scope
and amount of federal disaster assistance remain debatable subjects. See MAY, supra
note 100, at 40. May notes that every disaster act beginning with the 1950 DRA
explicitly stated that federal relief was “supplemental” to state and local relief efforts, but
what that means in terms of state and federal responsibilities has been unclear. Id. at 26.
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5131-34.
112. Id. §§ 5141-65(c).
113. Id. §§ 5170-97. Major disaster assistance programs include emergency
assistance programs and emergency preparedness. See id. §§ 5191-93, 5195-97(h).
114. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 22 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070,
3090.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2000). The 1970 Act contained identical language.
Disaster Relief Act of 1970 § 101(b), Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744. The 1970 and
Stafford Acts emerged from an era of congressional generosity toward disaster victims,
and thus expanded federal disaster assistance beyond the limits of prior disaster relief
acts. See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 45-47.
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To trigger the assistance of the federal government, the Governor of
the affected state must request one of two declarations by the President.116
The Governor may request either a “major disaster” declaration or an
“emergency” declaration.117 This two-tiered system represents one of
the changes the Stafford Act made to the system of disaster relief;
previous disaster relief acts only provided for a declaration of a major
disaster.118 The distinction created under the Stafford Act allows the
federal government to extend help during emergencies that do not rise to
the level of a “major disaster.”119 Once the Governor submits her request,
the President then decides what declaration to make, if any, in response
to the request.120
If the President grants the request, the Associate Director of the
Readiness, Response, and Recovery Directorate designates both the
types of assistance available and the areas eligible for assistance.121 The
FEMA Director then notifies the Governor of this designation.122 The
FEMA Director also appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer who is
charged with ensuring that federal assistance is provided.123

116. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (“Based on the request of a Governor under this section, the
President may declare under this chapter that a major disaster or emergency exists.”).
For further explanation of the declaration process and available assistance, see FEMA, A
Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal Disaster Assistance, available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/recover/dec_proc.pdf.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 5170.
118. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1970 § 102(1); Disaster Relief Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 2, 80 Stat. 1316 (repealed 1970).
119. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 3, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3072.
Technical assistance, advisory personnel, equipment, food, other supplies, personnel,
medical care, and other essentials are provided in an emergency declaration. 44 C.F.R. §
206.62 (2005). Assistance authorized by an emergency declaration is limited to
immediate and short-term aid. Id. § 206.63. Other benefits, such as loan assistance, are
not provided unless the President declares a major disaster. See id. § 206.361.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 5170. Whether a governor requests a major disaster or emergency
declaration, the President may always deny the request. 44 C.F.R. § 206.38 (2005). If a
governor requests a major disaster declaration, the President may choose to make an
emergency declaration instead of granting or denying the request outright. Id.
121. 44 C.F.R. § 206.40(a)-(b) (2005).
122. See id. § 206.39(c). The notification comes from either the director of the
regional FEMA office or the associate director of the Readiness, Response and Recovery
Directorate. Id. §§ 206.2, 206.39(c).
123. Id. § 206.41(a).
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C. Food Commodities and the Stafford Act
The provision of the Stafford Act particularly pertinent to this
discussion describes the federal government’s role in providing food
commodities to disaster victims.124 Section 5180 provides a basis for
Hurricane Katrina victims’ claims if it can be shown to fall outside of
the discretionary function exception.125
The Stafford Act expanded the federal role in providing food
commodities to disaster victims.126 Section 5180 assigns responsibility
to the President to prepare for emergency mass feeding or distribution of
food in any area suffering a major disaster or emergency.127 The
Secretary of Agriculture is to use funds to purchase any necessary food
supplies.128
Section 5180 was one of the more significant amendments proposed
by the Stafford Act.129 The 1950 and 1966 Disaster Acts did not contain
any provisions regarding food commodities.130 The 1969 and 1970 Acts
124. 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a) (2000) (“The President is authorized and directed to
assure that adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available for
emergency mass feeding or distribution in any area of the United States which suffers a
major disaster or emergency.”).
125. Hurricane Katrina victims might also base a claim on Stafford Act § 5151,
which prohibits discrimination in disaster assistance. Section 5151 states:
The President shall issue, and may alter or amend, such regulations as may be
necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Federal assistance
functions at the site of a major disaster or emergency. Such regulations shall
include provisions for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the processing
of applications, and other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished
in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of
race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status.
42 U.S.C. § 5151(a). The import of § 5151 is unclear. On the one hand, § 5151 seems to
incorporate into the Stafford Act certain protections afforded under the Constitution.
E.g., The Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. By that reading, § 5151
adds little to the Stafford Act. On the other hand, § 5151 might be read to go further
than the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of
economic status.
126. See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 47.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a).
128. Id. § 5180(b) (“The Secretary of Agriculture shall utilize funds appropriated
under section 612c of title 7, to purchase food commodities necessary to provide
adequate supplies for use in any area of the United States in the event of a major disaster
or emergency in such area.”). Section 612c of Title 7 establishes a fund to which 30% of
gross receipts from duties collected under customs laws. See 7 U.S.C. § 612c (2000)
(amended 2002). Money from the fund may be used to encourage the exportation or
domestic consumption of agricultural commodities, and to reestablish farmers’
purchasing power. See id.
129. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 1-2 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070,
3070-71.
130. See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109; Disaster
Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 2, 80 Stat. 1316 (repealed 1970). The 1970
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authorized the President to distribute food coupons and surplus
commodities but left distribution to his discretion.131 A “lack of surplus
commodities . . . raised questions about [the government’s] ability to
provide sufficient supplies for mass feeding and for home use after
major disasters.”132 The drafters of the Stafford Act noted the essential
nature of food stuffs following a disaster,133 and believed § 5180 “clearly
delineate[s]” federal responsibilities in the areas of food assistance and
mass feeding.134
Section 5180 has not garnered much attention from courts or executive
agencies. No case law exists interpreting the food commodities provision.
Regulations promulgated under the Stafford Act repeat the main
statutory language and delegate responsibility to the Associate Director
for Homeland Security.135 Despite the scarcity of judicial or administrative
materials interpreting § 5180, established methods of statutory interpretation
reveal a few key features of the provision. The plain language of the
statute, applicable canons of construction, and the legislative history of
the Stafford Act all support the conclusion that § 5180 places a
mandatory duty on the President to provide adequate food to disaster
victims.
Unlike many portions of the Stafford Act, the statutory language of
§ 5180 is mandatory in nature.136 The President is “directed” to assure
and Stafford Acts, in comparison, were more generous and extensive, and provided more
benefits to victims of catastrophes. See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 47.
131. Disaster Relief Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-79, § 11(a), 83 Stat. 125, 129;
Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-606, § 238(a), 84 Stat. 1744, 1755 (repealed
1974).
132. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 7, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3076. The
decision to replace the USDA family food distribution program with food stamps
exacerbated these concerns. Id.
133. 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10511 (1974) (“Use of surplus food stuffs for mass
feeding . . . is especially essential . . . after a . . . catastrophe when thousands may be
dislocated and the normal economy has seriously disrupted.”) (statement of Sen.
Burdick); see also S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 7, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070,
3076.
134. 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10513 (1974) (“Sections 409 and 410 clearly delineate
federal responsibilities in the areas of food assistance and mass feeding. These are areas
in which the impending lapse of certain legislative authorities could have resulted in
insurmountable administrative problems.”) (statement of Sen. Domincini).
135. 44 C.F.R. § 206.151(a) (2005) (“The Associate Director will assure that
adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available for emergency mass
feeding or distribution in any area of the United States which suffers a major disaster or
emergency.”).
136. Most substantive provisions of the Stafford Act contain permissive language
such as “may” or “is authorized to.” See, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of
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availability of food supplies, and the Secretary “shall” utilize funds to
purchase such supplies.137 Turning first to the plain meaning of the
words, we see that the President is given authority to provide food
commodities and also commanded to use that authority.138 The term
directed should be interpreted separately, in order to avoid surplusage.139
To read § 5180 as anything other than a mandatory command would
render directed meaningless.140 Section 5180 must therefore be read as
giving the President authority to make food commodities available, and
making exercise of that authority mandatory.
On the other hand, canons of construction are not mandatory rules and
do not foreclose alternative readings.141 One can frequently point to
opposing canons with respect to the same principle of statutory
construction.142 For example, plain language may not be given effect if
literal interpretation would lead to absurd consequences, and words
inadvertently inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statutes may be
rejected as surplusage.143 Thus, the conclusion that § 5180 prescribes a
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5152 (2000) (authorizing the President to enter into agreements with
disaster assistance organizations); id. § 5170a (“In any major disaster, the President
may . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 5173 (authorizing the President to clear debris
“whenever he determines it to be in the public interest”). Mandatory language is more
common in procedural provisions. See, e.g., id. § 5156 (“The President shall establish
comprehensive standards [for] assess[ing] . . . efficiency and effectiveness . . . .”
(emphasis added)); id. § 5143 (“[T]he President shall appoint a Federal coordinating
officer to operate in the affected area.” (emphasis added)).
137. Id. § 5180.
138. “The President is authorized and directed . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
139. “It is, moreover, ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute
ought . . . to be so construed that . . . no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant.’” Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489
n.13 (2004) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); see also HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS 165-67 (2d ed., 1911).
140. Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004)
(“[Respondent’s] reading would render part of the statute entirely superfluous,
something we are loath to do.”).
141. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). The Court in
Chickasaw Nation addressed a conflict between competing canons of construction: one
assumes statutes should be interpreted to benefit Native American tribes, but another
warns against interpreting statutes as providing tax exemptions. See id. at 95. The Court
concluded that the only reasonable reading of the statute at issue required it to reject
certain language as surplusage. Id. at 86.
142. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960).
Professor Llewellyn juxtaposes competing constructions as “thrust[s]” and “parr[ies]” in
argument. Id. at 522-28.
143. Id. at 524, 525. Justice Scalia criticizes several of Llewellyn’s thrust/parry
dichotomies as lacking proper support. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 25-26 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); cf. Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805
(1983) (noting the gap between scholarly criticism of the canons and their practical use
in judicial opinions).
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mandatory course of action should not rest on canons of construction
alone.
The legislative history of the Stafford Act supports an interpretation of
§ 5180 as mandatory. The 1970 Disaster Relief Act gave the President
authority to distribute food coupons and surplus food stuffs but left the
exercise of that authority to his discretion.144 Congress believed that
§ 5180 was one of the significant improvements on the 1970 Act,145 and
that its language clearly delineated federal responsibility vis-à-vis feeding
disaster victims.146 Because Congress intended § 5180 to require more
of the President than the 1970 Act, the mandatory language of the
section should not be discarded and ignored. Rather, § 5180 should be
read in a manner consistent with its plain language, recognized canons of
construction, and the legislative history of the Stafford Act.
D. The Stafford Act and the Discretionary Function Exception
Stafford Act § 5148 contains a discretionary function exception similar to
that of the FTCA.147 Understanding the Stafford Act discretionary
function exception is necessary before examining the claims Hurricane
Katrina victims can bring against the federal government. Judicial
interpretation of the Stafford Act discretionary function exception has
followed a path similar to that of the FTCA discretionary function
exception. Early decisions did not result in a clear rule or reason, but
recent cases utilize the two-part test promulgated in Berkovitz.148
Recognizing the similarity between the FTCA and Stafford Act
discretionary function exceptions, a majority of courts apply the FTCA
144. See Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, § 238(a), 84 Stat. 1744,
1755.
145. See S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 2, 7-8 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3070, 3071.
146. See supra note 134.
147. The Stafford Act discretionary function exception states:
The Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the
exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal
Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2000). This language parallels that of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(exempting discretionary functions from the FTCA general waiver of sovereign
immunity). The Stafford Act discretionary function exception has been part of federal
disaster legislation since the 1950 Act. See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109. 1110.
148. See, e.g., Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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two-part test to determine whether § 5148 applies in claims arising from
disaster relief.149 The exception shields from review determinations of
eligibility for disaster relief and benefits,150 decisions regarding funding,151
and certain decisions regarding debris removal.152 The exception does
not bar claims of negligent operation of a vehicle by a government
employee,153 nor does it apply to funding decisions when specific award
conditions have been set.154
The first case to address the discretionary function exception of the
Stafford Act involved an effort to recover Emergency Feed Program
disaster assistance payments.155 The court in Ornellas v. United States
held that the discretionary function provision precluded liability for any
actions or inactions involving disaster relief.156 The court deemed
disaster assistance a “gratuity,” and held that liability should not be
imposed for discretionary acts under gratuitous programs.157 The court
also found support for this view in the Stafford Act’s legislative
history.158
149. See, e.g., id. at 1351, 1353; Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips &
Jordan, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 283, 285 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
150. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
151. See Burgos-Montes v. Municipality of Yauco, 294 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.P.R.
2003); California-Nevada Methodist Homes, Inc. v. FEMA, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
152. See Sunrise Village, 960 F. Supp. at 286 (involving cleanup efforts in the wake
of Hurricane Andrew).
153. See Torres v. United States, 979 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (D.V.I. 1997) (holding
the exception inapplicable notwithstanding fact that the government employee was
driving between FEMA sites).
154. See Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1998).
155. Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 379 (1983). The Emergency Feed
Program was initially implemented under the provisions of the Stafford Act, and was
subsequently replaced by a similar program under the Food and Agricultural Act. Id. at
379 n.1. Under this program, farmers could receive disaster payments for the cost of
cattle feed. Id. at 378. The Food and Agriculture Act did not contain a discretionary
function exception. Id. at 379 n.1. The court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the latter
act should govern because: (1) the eligibility regulations were in effect at the time of
plaintiffs’ applications; and (2) the applications were submitted before the Food and
Agricultural Act took effect. Id.
156. Id. at 379.
157. Id. at 380 (citing D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505,
507-08 (Cl. Ct. 1967)).
158. Id. The court relied on the following statement as evidence of Congress’s
intent to bar all claims regarding disaster relief:
We have further provided that if the agencies of the Government make a
mistake in the administration of the Disaster Relief Act that the Government
may not be sued. Strange as it may seem, there are many suits pending in the
Court of Claims today against the Government because of alleged mistakes
made in the administration of other relief acts, suits . . . because citizens have
averred that the agencies and employees of Government made mistakes. We
have put a stipulation in here that there shall be no liability on the part of the
Government.
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Ornellas reached the correct result, but through a misguided interpretation
of § 5148. The court erroneously interpreted § 5148 as barring all claims
arising from disaster relief.159 This approach read the word discretionary
out of the statute. If all disaster relief is discretionary, the word
discretionary becomes mere surplusage.160 The presence of the word
discretionary infers that some acts of the federal government in
providing disaster relief are non-discretionary.161 There is no need to
resort to legislative history if a statute is plain on its face.162 Finally, the
notion that the federal government should not be liable for “gratuitous”
programs has little judicial authority163 and invites the same sort of
quagmire as the governmental/non-governmental distinction that arose
from early FTCA cases.164
The Ornellas court reached the correct decision despite its faulty
reasoning. Although the Stafford Act does not bar all claims arising
from disaster relief, determinations of eligibility under the Emergency
Feed Program are discretionary functions under the two-part test. In
the absence of clear and mandatory guidelines, determinations of
eligibility for disaster relief and benefits involve policy judgments.165
Id. (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11895, 11912 (1950) (statement of Rep. Whittington)). The
statement came from debates regarding the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, in which the
discretionary function exception first appeared. See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L.
No. 81-875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109, 1110. The court took this statement to mean Congress
intended to raise a statutory barrier to all judicial review. Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380.
159. Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380.
160. Canons of construction require courts to give effect whenever possible to every
word of the written law. See BLACK, supra note 139, at 165-67.
161. The statements from legislative history similarly render the term discretionary
meaningless. It appears that the Ornellas court relied on the following statement from
legislative history: “We have put a stipulation in here that there will be no liability on the
part of the Government.” See Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11895,
11912).
162. See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 392, 397 n.3
(1998). While current Justices may differ as to the usefulness of legislative history, none
contend it should prevail over the statutory language when a conflict exists between the
two. Compare SCALIA, supra note 143, at 17 (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of
the lawgiver.”), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 866 (1992) (“I do not see how one can criticize courts
that use legislative history on conceptual grounds.”).
163. The authority upon which Ornellas relied in classifying emergency assistance
as a gratuity involved highway construction, not disaster assistance, and was decided on
the bases of contract and agency theories. Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (citing D.R. Smalley
& Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505, 507-08 (Cl. Ct. 1967)).
164. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
165. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(applying the exception to a determination that the city was ineligible for disaster relief
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Administrators must allocate finite resources based on disaster victims’
relative needs.166 Eligibility decisions thus meet the first prong of the
Berkovitz test because they involve an element of judgment or choice.167
The administrative decisions at issue in Ornellas would therefore be
shielded from review by reason of their discretionary nature.168
Not all actions undertaken by the federal government in providing
disaster relief are discretionary.169 In Dureiko v. United States,170 the court
applied the two-part discretionary function test to a breach of contract
claim.171 There, FEMA sought sites where it could place temporary
housing and operate its relief efforts.172 Dureiko agreed to lease sites to
FEMA, but only after allegedly requiring a list of assurances.173 He then
sued the United States and its subcontractors for allegedly failing to
follow the agreed-upon procedures in conducting its cleanup efforts.174
The Dureiko court held that the discretionary function exception did
not bar the plaintiff’s contract claim.175 Although FEMA’s initial decision
to contract with the plaintiff involved an element of judgment or choice;
its subsequent compliance with the contract did not.176 The court found
following the collapse of a hillside); cf. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding the exception did not apply to eligibility determinations when regulations
established objective requirements of the award conditions).
166. See Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[D]ecisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited governmental resources
are the type of administrative judgment that the discretionary function exception was
designed to immunize from suit.”).
167. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
168. See California-Nevada Methodist Homes, Inc. v. FEMA, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1202
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding the exception applied to denial of requested disaster relief
funds); City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16. In defense of the Ornellas
decision, it should be noted that the Berkovitz two-part test had not yet been
promulgated.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54. Additionally, the discretionary
function exception does not bar constitutional claims. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004,
1008 (11th Cir. 1987); accord Lockett v. FEMA, 836 F. Supp. 847, 854 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Adherence to constitutional guidelines is mandatory, not discretionary. Rosas, 826 F.2d
at 1008. Plaintiff in Rosas v. Brock challenged a regulation defining “unemployed
worker” in disaster areas, arguing that the definition violated constitutional, statutory,
and regulatory provisions. Id. at 1006-07. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of
plaintiff’s statutory and regulatory claims, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of
his constitutional claim. Id. at 1010. The court found no reason to believe Congress
intended to grant agencies discretion to act unconstitutionally. Id. at 1008.
170. 209 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1348. Dureiko operated a mobile home park in Dade County, Florida.
Id. FEMA personnel were in the area in response to Hurricane Andrew. Id.
173. Id. Dureiko claimed to have witnessed damage to other mobile home parks at
the hands of government cleanup contractors, and thus demanded assurances. Id.
174. Id. at 1352.
175. Id. at 1352-53.
176. Id. at 1353. The court noted that the government’s position would allow it to
avoid paying contractors for their cleanup efforts. Id.
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the contract was indistinguishable from a statute or regulation dictating a
specific course of conduct for an employee to follow.177 FEMA and its
subcontractors had no choice but to comply with the terms of the alleged
contract; there was no discretion for the exception to protect.178
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA: CAUSE OF ACTION?
The federal response to Hurricane Katrina was admittedly inadequate.179
Whether the response gives rise to any liability is a separate question.
This Part examines the litigation prospects for complaints filed by
Hurricane Katrina victims based on the food commodities provision of
the Stafford Act. Claims based on the food commodities provision must
first overcome the discretionary function exception.180 The following
analysis explains why claims focusing on the inadequate quantity of
food supplies, rather than the inconvenient availability of such supplies,
are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss.
Section 5180 requires the President to assure adequate supplies of
food are ready and conveniently available for disaster victims.181 When
Hurricane Katrina hit on Monday, August 29, close to 100,000 New
Orleans residents remained in the city.182 The number of people requiring
food was both expected and predictable. One hundred thousand people
remained in New Orleans after the evacuation order, a figure in line with
pre-disaster scenarios and predictions, including the 2004 Hurricane

177. Id. The court noted that under both a contract and a regulation or statute, “the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to [its] directive[s].” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
178. Id.
179. See Bush Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, supra note 15.
180. Claims based on the nondiscrimination provision, on the other hand, need not
address the discretionary function exception because compliance with constitutional
principles is never discretionary. See Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.
1987). Black or African-Americans constitute 67.3% of the New Orleans population,
and over one-quarter of the population live below the poverty line, according to the 2000
census. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5. These statistics suggest that the federal
response had a disparate impact on minority and low-income citizens, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 5151 (2000). Alleging a violation of § 5151 would help insulate Hurricane
Katrina victims’ complaints from a motion to dismiss. A claim based on § 5151 would
ensure the litigation continued even if the court determined that the discretionary
function exception barred other claims they raised.
181. For a discussion of § 5180, see supra Part III.C.
182. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1.
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Pam exercise.183 One in five of New Orleans’s 480,000 residents did not
have a car184 and thus faced great difficulty in evacuating.
Despite this knowledge, the federal government was slow to respond.
“[There was] no evidence that food and water supplies were formally
ordered for the Convention Center, where more than 10,000 evacuees
had assembled, until days after the city had decided to open it as a
backup emergency shelter.”185 Federally supplied food provisions did
not mobilize until Wednesday,186 and the Superdome, a designated refuge,
ran out of food and water on Friday.187
The discretionary function exception may nonetheless provide a
powerful defense for the government. If the exception applies to § 5180,
food-related litigation will terminate on a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.188 A court will therefore examine § 5180
under the two-part test to determine whether it shields the government
from liability.189
A court must first determine whether the action is a matter of choice
for the relevant government employee.190 The plain language and
legislative history of § 5180 reveal that the duty to provide adequate
food is mandatory, and canons of construction support this interpretation.191
Even if an official duty is mandatory, the discretionary function exception
will apply if the statute or regulation in question does not provide a
“fixed or readily ascertainable standard” for performing the duty.192 The
exception might therefore be said to apply to § 5180 because neither the
statute nor the applicable regulations define precisely what constitutes
183. The Hurricane Pam exercise used realistic weather and damage information to
help officials develop response plans for a catastrophic hurricane in Louisiana. FEMA,
Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?
id=13051 (last visited July 16, 2006). According to the Hurricane Pam scenario, only
one-third of New Orleans residents would evacuate prior to the storm’s arrival. TimesPicayune, In Case of Emergency, http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/newsrelated/incase
ofemrgencyexercise.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
184. Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42-52.
185. Lipton, Levee’s Failure, supra note 3, at A1. Although FEMA planned to
have 360,000 ready-to-eat meals and fifteen trucks of water delivered to the city in
advance of the storm, only 40,000 meals and five trucks arrived. Id.
186. The government dispatched 400 trucks, carrying 5.4 million meals. Evan
Thomas, How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 33.
187. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1.
188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) is not the only mechanism by
which a party may challenge subject matter jurisdiction, but it is the earliest opportunity
to do so. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (allowing parties to challenge subject matter
jurisdiction at any time).
189. The development and operation of the two-part test is described supra, Part
II.C.2.
190. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
192. See Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1993).
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“adequate” food supplies.193 This argument fails, however, because any
interpretation of “adequate” perforce involves an amount proportionate
to the number of victims predicted to remain behind.194
Under the second part of the test, the court examines whether the
judgment is of the kind the discretionary function exception was designed
to shield.195 The exception, as a retention of sovereign immunity, is designed
to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative
decisions.196 This characterization of the discretionary function exception
reflects a concern for separation of powers and an aversion to “government
through litigation.”197
In this case, a court need not engage in judicial second-guessing to
find that the federal government failed in its duty to provide adequate
food. The Hurricane Pam exercise and other pre-disaster scenarios
provide sufficient objective information to evaluate the government’s
response.198 Therefore, a court would not need to substitute its judgment
for that of the executive branch. Moreover, separation of powers does
not insulate the decisions of the coequal branches of government from
judicial review,199 and litigation provides a mechanism for government
accountability.200 Assuming a court proceeds to the second part of the
Berkovitz test, it should find the discretionary function exception is not
designed to shield decisions regarding “adequate” food for Hurricane
Katrina victims predicted to remain in New Orleans.
The discretionary function exception will more likely bar claims
alleging violation of the “conveniently available” provision of § 5180.
193. For the full text of § 5180(a) and 44 C.F.R. § 206.151(a), see supra notes 124,
135.
194. The American Heritage Dictionary defines adequate as: “1. Sufficient to
satisfy a requirement or meet a need. . . . 2. Barely satisfactory or sufficient: The
skater’s technique was only adequate.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 25 (4th ed. 2000).
195. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; see also Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d
1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A court turns to the second part of the Berkovitz test only if
it finds the decision involved an element of judgment. Nonetheless, the test is examined
here.
196. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704
(1949); see also Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (4th Cir. 1971) (characterizing
the policy of Larson as avoiding “substantial bothersome interference with the operation
of government).
197. See Niles, supra note 34, at 1312.
198. See Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, supra note 183; see also Lipton et al.,
Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1.
199. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1218.
200. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 573.
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“[D]ecisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited
governmental resources are the type of administrative judgment that
the . . . exception was designed to immunize from suit.”201 Thus, if FEMA
officials decided to establish a food distribution center at the Superdome
instead of the Convention Center, that decision would be properly
protected by the discretionary function exception.
Although food was unavailable at both the Superdome and Convention
Center, this is more reflective of a failure to provide adequate supply
than to make food conveniently available. Moreover, judicial review of
the convenient availability of food commodities does raise legitimate
concerns of judicial second-guessing and micromanagement of executive
agencies. Therefore, Hurricane Katrina victims would do well to focus
their § 5180 claims on the adequacy of food commodities, not the
location at which they were or were not distributed.
To illustrate this point further, consider the court’s decision in
Dureiko. Recall the court’s holding that while FEMA’s initial decision
to enter into a contract was discretionary, its acts pursuant to the contract
were mandatory.202 A contrary interpretation would allow FEMA to
avoid having to pay contractors for cleanup efforts.203 Section 5180
requires similar, but inverted, reasoning. The initial decision of whether
or not to send food to a disaster area is mandatory, but decisions of
where and how to distribute the food require discretion. To interpret the
adequacy provision of § 5180 otherwise would allow the President to
send no food at all and then claim the protection of the discretionary
function exception.
Thus, by focusing on the inadequate quantity of food supplied by the
federal government, Hurricane Katrina victims maximize their chances
of surviving a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function
exception. Assuming that claims based on § 5180 are legally sufficient,
we turn to potential vehicles for recovery.
V. VEHICLES FOR RECOVERY
Having discussed the basis for claims Hurricane Katrina victims might
bring against the federal government, focus now shifts to the vehicles for
recovery that might be available. Two vehicles are discussed in this
Part: a victim compensation fund along the lines of the September 11th
fund, and a class action lawsuit. After assessing the relative merits of
each, it concludes that a class action provides the best vehicle for recovery.
201.
202.
203.
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A. Victim Compensation Fund
One potential vehicle for recovery would be a victim compensation
fund modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 (the Fund).204 The Fund represented a novel approach to postcatastrophe relief by establishing an alternative to recovery through
traditional tort remedies. Although the tort option was not foreclosed for
the victims of September 11th, Congress provided incentives that would
channel claims into the no-fault compensation scheme established by the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.205 “[C]laimants
eligible under the Fund are put to a choice—they must elect either to
claim benefits under the Fund or to waive their rights [to Fund benefits]
and pursue a tort claim.”206 Tort remained available as an option for
those who fell outside the eligibility limits.207
A Hurricane Katrina victim compensation fund (VCF) would provide
two main improvements on traditional tort recovery. First, it would
avoid the delays and expense of protracted litigation. Resources and
energies that would otherwise go to pursuing and defending claims could
be put to more socially beneficial uses, such as rebuilding the Gulf Coast
region. Second, a VCF would minimize the government’s potential
liability to Hurricane Katrina victims. A VCF provides incentives for
Hurricane Katrina victims to accept the benefits offered and forego tort
claims; the government could thus capitalize its outlays to victims, rather
than face uncertainty as to the amounts that presumably sympathetic
juries may award. In addition to these benefits, a VCF also provides a
mechanism for the government to compensate victims more quickly than
would tort litigation.208
Benefits notwithstanding, a VCF is unlikely to materialize. First,
unlike the World Trade Center attacks of September 11th, a hurricane

204. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003)).
205. Id. § 405(b)(2); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and
Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 46064 (2003) (noting such aspects of the VCF as prompt payment, nonadversarial
proceedings, and the ability to obtain a preliminary estimate of recovery).
206. Rabin, supra note 22, at 785.
207. Id.
208. Cf. John Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1027, 1035-36 (2003) (observing the promptness with which the Air Transportation
Safety and Stabilization Act, and the VCF in particular, were created and passed).
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striking the Gulf Coast region was not unprecedented.209 Although
Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude distinguished it from average storms
witnessed during hurricane season, it did not engender the reaction that
characterized the days and weeks immediately following September
11th. There was certainly an outpouring of support to Hurricane Katrina
victims, but there was not the sense, as existed following September
11th, that all Americans had suffered losses.210 This might be traced in
part to the relative unforeseeability of the September 11th attacks and in
part to the distinction between man-made disasters and natural disasters.211
Second, political pressures for rapid recovery are not as strong with
regard to Hurricane Katrina as existed for the victims of September 11th.
“A long and bitter contest over liability [for September 11th victims] . . .
almost certainly would have been regarded as intolerable to the national
community.”212 While many Americans believe the federal government
responded inadequately to Hurricane Katrina, the sense that immediate
recovery is essential does not exist. Third, the insolvency concerns that
prompted creation of the Fund are absent with respect to Hurricane
Katrina. It is likely that mass tort claims in the wake of September 11th
would have thrown major players in the airline industry into bankruptcy.213
No analogous private industry exists in the Hurricane Katrina scenario to
provide similar pressures for a no-fault alternative to tort liability.
Moreover, general criticisms of VCFs apply here as well.214 First, the
premise on which a VCF rests is uncertain: Should payments from the
Fund be based primarily on the unmet needs of the victim, taking into
account collateral sources of recovery such as insurance, or should they
seek individualized justice without regard for collateral sources?215
209. See Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, supra note 183.
210. See Rabin, supra note 22, at 772 (stating that case-by-case contests over tort
claims do not carry the emotional resonance and national empathy generated toward the
victims of September 11th).
211. For a discussion of how notions of fault, blame, and compensation have
changed with respect to natural and man-made disasters, see generally Lawrence M.
Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to ManMade Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003) (surveying over one hundred years of disasters).
212. Rabin, supra note 22, at 771.
213. See id. (asserting that insolvency concerns, more than any other single factor,
explain Congress’s speed in setting up the Fund).
214. Some criticisms include: treating married and unmarried people differently,
providing no compensation to people whose injuries will manifest themselves later, and
homogenizing noneconomic loss claims. See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052.
Professor Culhane argues that deeper philosophical objections surround the very
existence of the Fund, as well as its operation. Id.
215. See David Y. Stevens, Note, Tort Liability After the Dust Settles: An Economic
Analysis of the Airline Defendants’ Duty to Ground Victims in the September 11
Litigation, 80 IND. L.J. 545, 561-62 (2005) (discussing “secondary cost reductions” in
compensating victims).
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Additionally, payments from a VCF raise difficult issues of line drawing:
How can the system make principled distinctions between victims’
situations without creating arbitrary categories?216 Finally, there is the
question of the precedent a Hurricane Katrina victim compensation fund
would set for future natural disasters. Continuing a VCF model in the
future would increase costs of disaster relief and disregard the traditional
principle that liability does not attend to “acts of God.”217 On the other
hand, if the Hurricane Katrina VCF was a one-time-only response, we
risk violating the principle of similar treatment should the government
respond inadequately to some future disaster.
Despite a VCF’s benefits and appeal, inadequate institutional
pressures exist to encourage the federal government to establish one.
Additionally, the uncertain principles upon which a VCF rests raise valid
objections to its existence in the first place.
B. Class Action
A second potential vehicle for recovery is a certified class action.
Class actions carry their own unique benefits and burdens. Although a
mass tort class action would be difficult to maintain, it nonetheless
appears to be the preferred vehicle for Hurricane Katrina victims to
recover for their losses.218
1. Benefits and Problems of Class Actions
Class actions rose to prominence in the 1970s as a particular form of
joinder device.219 They were initially trumpeted as a means for the
common person to seek remedies from powerful defendants against
whom less powerful plaintiffs would have little chance of success in

216. See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052.
217. See, e.g., Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1550,
1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A party may be deemed negligent yet still be exonerated from
liability if the act of God would have produced the same damage irrespective of the
party’s negligence.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451 (1965) (defining
an intervening “extraordinary force of nature”).
218. Mass tort class actions seeking monetary recovery proceed under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
219. Interestingly, the Advisory Committee to the 1966 Amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) believed the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) rendered
class actions inappropriate for “mass accident” litigation. Mary J. Davis, Toward the
Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 171-72 (1998).
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conventional litigation.220 While this Comment is not intended as a
treatise on class actions, a cursory review of the benefits of class actions
is in order. First, class actions allow recovery for persons who might
otherwise have remained ignorant of their injury or the possibility of
recovery.221 Second, class actions are more economically feasible for
aggrieved parties insofar as class action plaintiffs can share the cost of
retaining counsel and other litigation expenses.222 Third, class actions
provide an incentive to litigate collectively where no such incentive
might exist individually.223 A common example is a scenario in which a
large number of plaintiffs suffered minor losses; their collective loss
provides an incentive to sue, whereas their individual losses would
not.224 Finally, class actions provide a method of fair allocation of resources.
All class members share the amount awarded, and any settlement or
compromise requires court approval.225
Class action lawsuits contain their own unique problems. First, class
members exercise little control over the litigation.226 This is the tradeoff resulting from collective representation and the incentives to litigate
collectively.227 Second, the res judicata effects of class actions bar
future claims from members of the class.228 Finally, aggregated claims
220. In the words of Justice Douglas, “Some of these [class action plaintiffs] are
consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have no practical recourse
for either remuneration or injunctive relief. . . . The class action is one of the few legal
remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo.” Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that Rule 23(b)(3) class members
receive notice of, inter alia, the nature of the action and the issues involved); see also
ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 377-78 (2000) (describing such requirements as “essential due process
elements for binding absent class members.”).
222. 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:18
(4th ed. 2002).
223. Id. § 5:7.
224. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 21, 22 (1996). Professor Fiss offers a price-fixing agreement in small
transactions as an illustration of this concept; the damage to an individual investor may
be only seventy dollars, but the damage inflicted on all investors reaches the millions.
Id.
225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also Manuel L. Real, What Evil Have We
Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, and Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 442
(1998) (“This rule is the foundation for much of the judge’s power to persuade and
facilitate fairness in settlement.”).
226. See KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 221, at 2 (“How can a court ensure that
class action dismissals and settlements do not end up benefiting counsel and defendants
at the expense of the class members?”).
227. Cf. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting From the Front Line—One Mediator’s
Experience With Mass Torts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 370 (1998) (noting the
impracticability for a mass tort class action lawyer to communicate with each and every
client).
228. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 222, §§ 5:36, 5:38.
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create a strong incentive to sue, thus increasing the risk of frivolous
lawsuits.229
2. Weighing Benefits and Problems for Hurricane Katrina Victims
The benefits of a class action are present to different degrees for
Hurricane Katrina victims. Hurricane Katrina victims are likely aware
of their injury—lack of food during the disaster—but may be unaware of
the possibility of recovery from the federal government. The economic
efficiency of pursuing a class action and the incentive it creates to
litigate are also significant benefits due to the socioeconomic status of
the average victim who remained behind.230 The degree to which class
action provides a fair allocation of resources is less clear for Hurricane
Katrina victims. For one thing, it raises a question similar to those
regarding a victim compensation fund: Short of dividing the recovery
amount equally among all members, how would the class determine
which members should receive what amount?231
The problems attending class actions are also unique with respect to
Hurricane Katrina victims. As mentioned, a lesser degree of control over
the litigation necessarily follows the benefits of collective representation
and litigation.232 The res judicata effect of the class action is less
problematic for a mass tort case because class members would be
provided an opportunity to “opt out” of the litigation and pursue their
claims individually.233 Given the particular fact scenario involved with
Hurricane Katrina, it may also be safely assumed that the class action
would be meritorious rather than frivolous litigation.234 Additionally, the
government’s protection under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
facilitates dismissal of frivolous claims against it.235

229. See Davis, supra note 219, at 187 (“Much of the recent criticism of class
actions . . . stems from the ‘blackmail settlement’ aspect of class actions, especially those
certified for settlement only and not for litigation.”).
230. Recall that over one-quarter of New Orleans’s population live below the
poverty line. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5.
231. See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052 (discussing limitations of the VCF); see
also Feinberg, supra note 227 (noting, with respect to mass tort settlements, the
difficulty of determining each class member’s individual award).
232. See supra text accompanying note 227.
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 182-87.
235. For a full discussion of sovereign immunity, see supra Part II.
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On balance, a Rule 23(b)(3) certified class action appears to be the
best vehicle for recovery available to Hurricane Katrina victims. A class
action retains most features of traditional tort litigation, such as the
plaintiff’s burden of proving all elements of their claim, but the high cost
of litigation can be shared among members of the class. A class action
also represents the best option for balancing the competing interests
underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.236 By allocating to
Hurricane Katrina victims the burden of proving their claims, class
action litigation protects against raids on the treasury to a greater extent
than a VCF.237 Should their claims prove meritorious, the class action
vehicle provides a channel by which the federal government may be held
accountable for its failure to provide adequate food supplies.238
VI. CONCLUSION
Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf coast region. This Comment
contends that citizens of New Orleans for whom the federal government
failed to provide adequate food supplies have a cause of action against
the federal government. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as reflected in
the discretionary function exception, should not bar Hurricane Katrina
victims’ claims because the duty to provide adequate food supplies is a
non-discretionary duty. A class action lawsuit provides the best vehicle
for recovery and best balances the competing policies underlying the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Federal disaster relief has improved dramatically over the past fifty
years. Under the Stafford Act, the federal government provides a range
of disaster relief from temporary housing to unemployment assistance.
While these federal programs are commendable, the government must
still be held accountable for its failings. When a statute provides a clear
directive to the federal government, like the directive of § 5180 of the
Stafford Act, the discretionary function exception should not apply.
Victims of the government’s failure to carry out that directive should
have their day in court.
NATHAN SMITH

236. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
237. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (raising fiscal concerns regarding
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
238. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1217 (arguing that the need for
governmental accountability outweighs fiscal concerns).
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